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Evaluating the Effectiveness of 
Quantitative Easing: An SVAR 
Approach 
 
Seth Walker 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The 2008 recession affected the American economy more than any recession since 
the Great Depression. Unlike its response to the Great Depression, the Federal 
Reserve aimed to stimulate the economy through all means in its power. However, 
the Federal Reserve’s conventional monetary policy tools were not viable options 
due to the zero lower bound. As a result, the Federal Reserve pursued an 
unconventional monetary policy tool known as quantitative easing which involved 
purchases of long-term assets on a scale never before seen in the United States. 
Since its inception, quantitative easing has faced significant scrutiny over its merit 
and has been the focus of research that has resulted in conclusions ranging from a 
complete failure to a resounding success. This paper focuses on quantitative 
easing’s effect on the macroeconomy and finds that although quantitative easing 
was effective in increasing inflation and lowering rates on long-term Treasuries and 
mortgages, there was a negative effect on real economic activity, casting doubt on 
how effective these programs were on stimulating the economy as a whole.  
 
	 6	
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 
The 2008 recession caused by the housing bubble burst presented a new 
challenge to the Federal Reserve: expansionary monetary policy at the zero lower 
bound (ZLB). The Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate (FFR) several 
times in the years leading up to 2008 in an attempt to stimulate the economy, 
causing interest rates to approach the ZLB. As a result, the Federal Reserve’s 
traditional monetary policy tool of lowering the short-term interest rate became 
ineffective, causing a need to find another method to aid the economy’s recovery. 
The Federal Reserve turned to a new and unproven tool called “quantitative easing” 
(QE). QE involved large-scale purchases of assets with longer maturities, such as 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS’s) and 10-year Treasuries, in an attempt to lower 
long-term interest rates and stimulate the economy. 
There were four waves of QE in the U.S. The first round (QE1) began in 
November 2008 and lasted until March 2010. During this time the Federal Reserve 
purchased roughly $1.7 trillion in MBS’s and government bonds in an attempt to 
lower mortgage rates and overall risk. In the words of the Federal Reserve, QE1 
aimed to “reduce cost and increase the availability of credit for the purchase of 
houses, which in turn should support housing markets and foster improved 
conditions in financial markets more generally.” (Federal Reserve Press Release, 
November 25th, 2008). The second round (QE2) involved the purchasing of $600 
billion in long-term Treasuries in an attempt to decrease long-term interest rates. 
QE3 occurred from November 2010 to June 2011 and took a two-pronged approach: 
	 7	
The Federal Reserve would continue to buy MBS’s and long-term Treasuries in the 
amount of $85 billion per month, while selling short-term Treasuries to finance 
their purchases. In theory, this would cause short-term rates to increase and long-
term rates to fall, thus decreasing the term premium or causing the yield curve to 
invert or “twist”. The last installment of quantitative easing (QE4) occurred from 
January 2013 to December 2014. The Federal Reserve committed to start buying 
$85 billion in Treasuries per month, with the expectation of this amount slowly 
tapering in order to allow Treasury yields and the unemployment rate to slowly 
adjust to smaller injections of money.  
The record amount of purchases by the Federal Reserve generated significant 
debate over the merit of this program and put monetary policy officials squarely in 
the global spotlight. Extensive research has been conducted on QE, yet there is by 
no means a consensus as to the effectiveness of QE. Most research focuses on the 
impact QE had on the financial sector, while this paper contributes to the more 
limited literature on evaluating the macroeconomic effectiveness of QE programs in 
the U.S.  
The effectiveness of QE on the U.S. economy will be examined below using a 
structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model. I will measure QE’s effect on long-
term rates and see if these effects passed through to increased real economic 
activity, proxied by real industrial production (Index: 2012=100). Viability of QE as 
a monetary policy depends on analysis results robustly showing that long-term 
rates fell, which passed into the macroeconomy in increased production and 
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inflation. Therefore, my final analysis will focus mainly on industrial production 
and inflation when evaluating the effectiveness of quantitative easing. Few studies 
have used SVAR models in analyzing macroeconomic variables, so this paper will 
provide insight from a different angle. The results of these models will provide 
evidence of the effectiveness of quantitative easing and its viability as a monetary 
policy tool to combat future recessions.  
The rest of the paper precedes as follows: Section 2 provides a brief 
explanation of the theory/mechanism behind quantitative easing while Section 3 
provides an extensive review of the existing literature on this topic. The overview 
not only helps identify the best specification for the SVAR model in terms of the 
functional form and the variables to be included, but also relates what other 
researchers have concluded about the efficacy of QE. Section 4 describes the data 
used in the analysis while Section 5 provides information on the methodology and 
models used in the paper. Next, Section 6 offers analysis and discussion of the main 
findings of the paper. Lastly, Section 7 contains concluding remarks.  
Section 2: How Does Quantitative Easing Work?  
As mentioned earlier, the Federal Reserve and most other central banks 
faced the ZLB starting around 2009. Figure 1 shows the policy rates of 4 major 
banks: the Bank of England (BOE), Federal Reserve Bank of the United States 
(US), Bank of Japan (BOJ), and European Central Bank (ECB). As a result of the 
ZLB, these central banks created QE programs to affect the economy through 
different, less familiar, channels. 
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Figure 1 
 
Policy Rates retrieved from data section of Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
 There are a number of different theories that describe how quantitative 
easing should affect an economy — this section focuses on a few of the more 
common models . First, as Doh (2010) discusses, the Federal Reserve’s purchases 
increased the demand for bonds following the 2008 crisis. As Figure 2 shows, this 
causes bond prices to increase, and thus, since prices and interest rates are 
inversely-related, interest rates to decrease. Since the Federal Reserve mainly 
purchased longer-term assets in its QE programs, longer-term interest rates should 
fall. Fawley and Neely (2013) describe how this channel works: When a central 
bank purchases assets of a certain duration, which are accompanied by a given level 
of risk, investors demand less compensation via lower interest rates for holding 
assets of that duration due to the low risk associated with central banks. As a result 
of lower interest rates, investment should increase and stimulate the economy 
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Figure 2 
 
through increased aggregate demand. This would lead to higher industrial 
production and prices — or at least prevention of further deflation. Similarly, Doh 
(2010) discusses the role the term premium, or spread between short-term and long-
term interest rates, has on stimulating the economy in the preferred-habitat model. 
Since the U.S. was facing the ZLB, a decrease in the term premium through 
lowering long-term interest rates would help stimulate the economy. The preferred-
habitat model relates the size of the decrease of the term premium to the level of 
risk aversion in the economy — the higher the risk aversion, the larger the decrease 
in the term premium, and vice versa. Risk aversion in the United States was high 
following the 2008 crisis, meaning QE should result in a relatively large decrease in 
the term premium and stimulation of the economy through increased aggregate 
demand. Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) discuss another theory that involves 
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steering inflation expectations, commonly referred to as “signaling”, as labeled by 
Bernanke et al. (2004). This theory asserts that changing expectations about future 
monetary policy changes inflation expectations. In this scenario, QE should result 
in an increase in inflation expectations. If these perceptions are permanent, long-
term interest rates would fall. As a result, aggregate demand would increase 
further, causing output and prices to increase more. While these theories use 
different mechanisms in explaining how QE should work, they all produce the same 
end result: increased output and prices.  
Section 3: Related Literature 
 
 Although QE was unfamiliar to most when the Federal reserve employed the 
tool in response to the Great Recession, it was not the first time such a program had 
been utilized. Coenen and Wieland (2003) note that “Operation Twist”, a 
predecessor to QE, occurred in 1961 in the U.S., and the BOJ officially started 
rounds of QE in 2001 that lasted for several years. The United Kingdom also 
employed QE following the 2008 crisis and the ECB began a program similar to QE 
in 2015. The QE programs by the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England were 
most similar as they both relied heavily on bond purchases, while the ECB and BOJ 
typically lent directly to banks. First, a brief discussion of these other QE programs 
is necessary to gauge the effectiveness of the tool in different countries, times, and 
circumstances. Then, the findings related to QE in the United States will be 
discussed. It is important to discuss the findings of the research conducted in all of 
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these areas to help frame the findings of this paper and discuss the validity of QE 
as a monetary policy tool as a whole.  
Section 3.1: Operation Twist 
 Previous research on Operation Twist offers intriguing results as to the 
effectiveness of this monetary tool. Fawley and Neely (2013) discuss the objective of 
Operation Twist was to lower long-term rates relative to short-term rates, thus 
“twisting” the yield curve. To do so, the Federal Reserve sold short-term assets 
while simultaneously purchasing longer-term assets. However, there is significant 
disagreement on the effectiveness of this tool. For one, Modigliani and Sutch (1966) 
found that Operation Twist was, at the very best, of “average success”. On the other 
hand, a study by Swanson (2011) found that Operation Twist in the 1960’s resulted 
in long-term Treasury yields dropping by approximately 15 basis points (BP). 
Nonetheless, this tool served as the basis for the Operation Twist that the Federal 
Reserve started beginning on September 21st, 2011, which directly led to QE3, as 
Fawley and Neely (2013) note. 
Section 3.2: Bank of Japan 
Studies on the effectiveness of QE by the BOJ suggest a statistically 
significant, positive impact on the economy, but temporary and smaller in size than 
one might expect. Ueda (2012) asserts that initial response to QE saw 10-year rates 
decrease by around 35 BP and the stock market index increase by nearly 20%. 
However, both of these returned to their original levels just a few months later. 
Meanwhile, Swanson (2011) concluded that QE did result in a decrease in the rates 
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on longer-term assets in Japan. Moreover, Bernanke, et al. (2004) found that the 
BOJ’s purchases of Japanese Government Bonds (JGB’s) had a statistically 
significant impact in lowering the rates on these bonds. Similarly, Schenkelberg 
and Watzka (2013) assert that QE led to a statistically significant decrease in long-
term interest rates, which caused a significant, but transitory, increase in output 
and prices. Their analysis also determined that prices increased by 5 BP and 
industrial production increased by 0.4% after 20 months, while long-term yields fell 
by 7 BP. Moreover, they came to this finding without imposing any sign restrictions 
on long-term yields since there is no definitive proof that QE causes long-term 
yields to decrease. As a result, long-term yields are able to increase or decrease, 
allowing for a better indication of the true impact QE has on long-term rates. More 
on this technique will be discussed later in this paper. However, Ugai (2007) 
discusses how other studies have found the impact to be insignificant and difficult 
to distinguish given the zero interest rate policy and other tools the BOJ employed 
at the time. The lack of a consensus on the effectiveness of the BOJ’s QE is a 
common thread in analysis of most central bank’s QE policies.  
Section 3.3 European Central Bank 
 The ECB began its QE program in March 2015 — much later than most other 
major central banks. The ECB planned on purchasing €60 billion worth of Euro-
area government bonds per month with purchases lasting until at least September 
2016. This amount increased to €80 billion in March 2016 and finally ended in 2019 
after a tapering in the amount of monthly purchases. In an analysis of the QE 
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program undertaken by the ECB, Peersman (2017) found that there was a 
statistically significant increase in output and prices one year after the program 
began. Furthermore, the peak effect of QE was at least 6 months later than the 
peak effect of conventional monetary policy. Peersman (2017) asserted that the 
purchases by the ECB had the same effect as a roughly 25 BP decrease in the policy 
rate or a 10% increase in the monetary base at a given policy rate. The analysis 
conducted by Gambacorta et al. (2014) of unconventional monetary policy in 8 
locations — Canada, the Eurozone, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., 
and the U.S. — found there was a significant, but temporary, increase in output and 
prices in the Eurozone as a result of QE. Gambacorta et al. (2014) also asserted that 
unconventional monetary policy tends to have a relatively larger impact on output 
than prices in percent terms (3:1), while conventional monetary policy still has a 
larger impact on output than prices, but by a smaller margin (1.5:1). All of these 
findings line up relatively well with the research done on QE by the BOJ: a 
statistically significant, but temporary, positive effect on the economy. However, the 
peak effect of QE on output by the BOJ occurred much quicker than the peak effect 
observed in the Euro area.  
Section 3.4: Bank of England  
The Bank of England began purchasing long-term assets around the same 
time the Federal Reserve did, but on a smaller scale. There were 3 major rounds of 
purchases in the U.K. as Meier (2009) notes. Fawley and Neely (2013) discuss the 
expansion of the QE program in the U.K.: Starting on March 5th, 2009, the Bank of 
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England announced it would purchase up to a total of £75 billion in assets, with the 
majority of these assets being medium to long-term gilts, the U.K. equivalent of 
U.S. Treasuries. This program was expanded several times through July 5th, 2012, 
at which point the Bank of England announced it would purchase up to £375 billion 
in longer-term assets. The Bank of England maintained that the goals of the 
program were to “boost the money supply through large-scale asset purchases and, 
in doing so, to bring about a level of nominal demand consistent with meeting the 
inflation target in the medium term.” (Bank of England Press Release, 2012). 
Previous studies by Kapetanios et al. (2012) and Palley (2011) have found that 
interbank borrowing rates dropped significantly following the first round of QE, 
asset and stock prices increased, government and corporate bond prices fell, and 
economic growth returned two quarters after the first purchases began. Joyce et al. 
(2012) suggest QE could have had as large of an effect as a 1.25% increase in real 
GDP and a 125 BP effect on the consumer price index. Further, Meier (2009) found 
that the announcement of QE in the U.K. was associated with a 35-60 BP decrease 
in gilt yields, while a study conducted by Joyce (2012) found that gilt yields fell by 
almost 100 BP and rates on long-term government bonds fell by 40 to 100 BP. 
Lastly, Reza et al. (2015) claim that gilt yields fell between 45 and 130 BP and GDP 
increased between 65 BP and 175 BP as a result of these large-scale purchasing 
programs. The analyses of the Bank of England’s QE offer the most definitive 
results that QE is a viable monetary policy tool.  
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The research involving the BOJ, ECB, and Bank of England suggest that QE 
has merit, but size and duration can vary depending on the structure, scope, and 
timing of the program. However, analysis of QE in the U.S. is still the most 
important, due to the size of the U.S. economy and scope of the QE programs.   
Section 3.5: Federal Reserve   
As discussed earlier, the Federal Reserve had several installments of QE and 
was the most active of all of the central banks in responding to the 2008 crisis. A 
study by Gagnon et al. (2011) found that the purchases between December 2008 and 
March 2010 had significant, long-lasting effects on the long-term interest rates of 
U.S. Treasuries, mortgage-backed securities, and corporate bonds, which is not 
frequently observed in the research on QE programs by other central banks. 
Further, the same study concluded that the first two rounds of QE reduced the 10-
year premium by 30-100 BP. An article by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2011) backed up these claims, but also noted that the effect on riskier corporate 
bonds (Baa or riskier) was noticeably smaller. Similarly, Nelson (2013) finds that 
QE1 was associated with a decrease in long-term Treasuries by 90 BP. Additionally, 
he found that QE1’s effect was roughly equivalent to a 400 BP slash of the FFR, 
while QE2’s effect was equal to a 40-120 BP decrease in the FFR. However, these 
estimates may overstate the effectiveness of QE. A study by Belke (2018) notes that 
long-term interest rates decreased in most countries worldwide, even though no QE 
had been undertaken in these countries as of yet. For example, rates in the Euro 
area decreased well before the ECB began its purchasing program. The same study 
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suggests there was a global downward trend in long-term interest rates during this 
time which many papers do not account for in their analyses, resulting in frequent 
overstating of the impact of QE. 
A few findings of the impact on macroeconomic variables include claims by 
Baumeister and Benati (2011) that the lower long-term rates positively affected 
output growth and significantly decreased the risk of deflation and “output 
collapse”. Similarly, the study by Liu et al. (2014) used counterfactual analysis and 
found that unemployment would have been 70 BP higher and inflation would have 
been 100 BP lower if the Federal Reserve had not conducted QE. A study by Chung 
et al. (2012) found similar results: These large-scale asset purchases increased real 
GDP by 3%, increased inflation by 100 BP, lowered the unemployment rate by 150 
BP, and decreased the term premium by 70 BP when compared to projected values 
of these measures had the Federal Reserve not undertaken QE. Lastly, Reza (2015) 
found the cumulative effect of the QE programs to have lowered the yield on 10-year 
Treasuries by 65-120 BP, while Dahlhaus et al. (2014) found that QE lowered 10-
year Treasuries by 82 BP.  
The analyses of QE in the U.S. are by far the most varied and contested. 
Generally, most studies find QE did lower long-term rates, but results on the 
impact on real economic activity are less clear. Further, the lag until peak impact is 
observed and how long the impact of QE lasts are both unclear as well. This paper 
attempts to add clarity to these issues.  
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Section 4: Data 
 
 The data used in this paper consists of 556 observations of 8 key 
macroeconomic variables. All observations are monthly and seasonally-adjusted, 
where applicable, from January 1973 to April 2019. The 8 variables are inflation 
(INFL), industrial production (IP), unemployment rate (UR), federal-funds rate 
(FFR), 30-year mortgage rate (M30), 10-year Treasury rate (T10), 1-year Treasury 
rate (T1), and the trade-weighted exchange rate (ER) (Index: 1997=100). Industrial 
production is used to measure output instead of GDP so that all variables have a 
monthly frequency since GDP is only measured at a quarterly frequency and lower. 
Inflation was calculated using the consumer price index (CPI). All data is available 
on the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) website run by the Federal Reserve 
Board of St. Louis. The Appendix provides additional information on the exact data 
used in this paper.  
Section 5: Methodology 
Section 5.1: Specification of VAR Model 
 To evaluate the effectiveness of QE the following reduced-form VAR model is 
used: 
Yt = c + A(L)Yt-1 + ut 
where Yt is a vector of endogenous variables, c is a vector of intercepts, A(L) is a 
matrix of autoregressive coefficients of lagged Yt values, and ut is a vector of 
residuals. The macroeconomic chosen for the benchmark regression are: 
Yt = {INFLt, T1t, T10t, FFRt, IPt, M30t, ERt, URt, RESt} 
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All of these variables achieve stationarity when differenced. 4 lags of each variable 
are included in this model using the AIC, while the ordering of the SVAR used in 
this paper is {IP, UR, INFL, ER, M30, T10, T1, FFR, RES}, in order of decreasing 
endogeneity, although different orderings resulted in similar results, which is 
discussed later in the paper.  
Section 5.2: Sign Restrictions 
 The main assumptions imposed in this model are threefold: 1) QE increases 
reserves, which signals the QE shock, 2) there is a non-zero increase in INFL as a 
result of QE, and 3) there is a subsequent reduction in the FFR as a result of the 
increase in reserves. These restrictions force the following responses: 1) Reserves 
increase immediately since that signals the shock, 2) inflation increases following 
the shock, and 3) the FFR decreases following the shock. These restrictions only 
limit the direction of the response — there is no effect on the magnitude. These 
assumptions are widely-accepted theories, as research by Coenen and Wieland 
(2003) and Peersman (2017) assert that QE leads to an increase in inflation, while 
the immediate negative impact on the federal funds rate when reserves increase is 
included as part of a coordinated monetary policy front. Yields, mortgage rates, and 
industrial production are left unrestricted since these are the main variables of 
interest that will reveal the impact of QE on the macroeconomy, while the exchange 
rate and unemployment rate are left unrestricted due to a lack of consensus on how 
QE affects these variables. Figure 3 below summarizes the sign restrictions 
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implemented in the model. Any variables not present in the table are left 
unrestricted.  
Figure 3 
Variable RES INFL FFR 
Restriction >0 ≥0 <0 
 
Section 6: Results 
Section 6.1: Impulse Response Functions 
Using these restrictions and the VAR model previously specified, Figure 11 in the 
appendix shows the impulse response functions for the 9 macroeconomics variables 
in the model. The red line represents the median impulse response function from a 
Bayesian vector autoregression with 10000 draws, while the blue lines represent 
the 16th and 84th percentiles of the posterior distribution of the impulse response 
functions. As noted above, the impulse is a positive shock to reserves, so all the 
graphs show the given variables’ response to this shock at that point in time, which 
explains the immediate positive response of reserves and inflation and the negative 
response of FFR. While the IRFs show how QE affected each of these variables 
during each month in the 60-month horizon, the cumulative effect of QE on each 
variable will be the main focus of the results since the overall effect of QE on long-
term interest rates, inflation, and industrial production in the years following QE is 
much more important than the effect QE had on these variables on a month-to-
month basis. A discussion of selected IRFs is presented below. The robustness of 
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these results hold in several different orderings of the VAR model, as the impulse 
response functions in Figures 11-14 in the Appendix show.  
Section 6.1a: Federal Funds Rate (FFR)                                                        Figure 4                         
The peak effect on FFR is observed 3-4 months after 
the initial shock at -18 BP, while the cumulative effect is a 
decrease of the FFR by 280 BP. The peak and cumulative 
effect on FFR in this study are both smaller in magnitude in 
comparison to other studies (see Nelson (2013)). However, 
the effect is still quite large and suggest that QE was 
effective in lowering the FFR.  
Section 6.1b: Unemployment Rate (UR)   
The impact that QE had on the unemployment rate     Figure 5   
changed signs during the 60-month horizon. Initially, QE 
caused the unemployment rate to increase, with a peak 
effect of 2.5 BP 4 months after the shock. However, the 
desired impact of QE seems to have a significant lag — 
starting 14 months after the shock, the unemployment 
rate began to fall and have the effect the Federal Reserve 
desired. The cumulative effect of QE on the unemployment 
rate during the 60-month horizon totals a respectable 
decrease of 79 BP, though this estimate is significantly              
smaller than the estimate provided by Chung et al. (2012).  
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Section 6.1c: Inflation (INFL) 
 Using the sign restrictions listed above, the peak effect of QE on inflation is 
12 BP 3-4 months after the shock to reserves. The impact on the inflation nearly 
disappears (2 BP) 20 months after the initial shock and hovers      Figure 6  
around this level for the remaining 40 months. The peak 
response of inflation is similar to the results of previous 
studies of QE in the U.S., but the cumulative effect on 
inflation paints a better picture. Over the 60-month 
horizon, QE resulted in a substantial increase in inflation 
of 142 BP. This estimate is slightly larger than the 
estimate provided by Liu et al. (2014), but still suggests 
that QE was effective in increasing inflation during the 
recession. 
Section 6.1d: 1-Year Treasuries (T1)                                                               Figure 7 
 QE appears to have had a larger impact on 1-Year 
Treasuries than any other variable even though the Federal 
Reserve aimed more to decrease rates on long-term bonds. 
The peak effect of QE on 1-Year Treasuries decreased rates by 
11 BP 2 months after the shock while the cumulative effect of 
QE on 1-Year Treasuries totaled a decrease of 230.5 BP.      
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Section 6.1e: 10-Year Treasuries (T10) and 30-Year Mortgages (M30)                         
As mentioned earlier, QE largely focused on lowering the rates on 10-Year 
Treasuries and 30-Year mortgages. The response of these rates suggest that these 
goals of the Federal Reserve’s QE programs were successful. The graph below shows 
both of these rates dropping without sign restrictions in response to the increase in 
reserves, which has been found nearly universally in          Figure 8          
other literature on the topic. Rates on 10-Year 
Treasuries fell by a peak value 5 BP 15 months after 
the initial shock and the impact remained negative 
for the duration of the 60-month horizon. The 
cumulative effect during the 60-month horizon totaled 
a decrease of 187 BP. This large decrease in the rate 
on long-term Treasury rates is a clear indication that 
QE was successful in lowering rates on long-term 
bonds. However, one goal of the Federal Reserve was to            Figure 9         
decrease the term premium, which appears to have 
been unsuccessful due to the larger decrease in rates on 
1-Year Treasuries than 10-Year Treasuries. 
Meanwhile, rates on 30-year mortgages fell by a 
peak value of 5 BP, which is also in-line with previous 
studies (see Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2011), Dalhaus (2014), Baumeister and Benati (2011), 
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Lenza et al. (2010)). The response of this variable to QE did remain negative for the 
entire duration of the 60-month horizon and had a cumulative effect of lowering 
rates on 30-year mortgages by 221.5 BP, another clear indication that the Federal 
Reserve’s goal of lowering long-term rates was successful. The cumulative effect on 
these rates is larger than in most research, but clearly suggests success in lowering 
long-term rates. However, the effect on real economic activity is still the 
determining factor of the efficacy of QE in U.S.   
Section 6.1f: Industrial Production (IP)          Figure 10 
  The response of IP to the shock suggests that 
QE was not successful in increasing real economic 
activity. Although the effect on IP was small in 
magnitude, the sign of its response to the increase in 
reserves is negative the entire 60-month horizon, 
implying that QE actually decreased real economic 
activity. In fact, the cumulative effect of QE lowered 
industrial production by 1.205%. As noted earlier, the 
impact on industrial production is slight for proponents of QE for most central 
banks: In Japan, Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) found a negative effect on 
industrial production for the first 15 months, which then switched to a small 
positive effect after 15 months. Meanwhile, Lenza et al. (2010) also found a dip in 
industrial production in the Euro area for several months following the 
unconventional monetary policy undertaken there. Proponents of QE explain this 
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observation through the lagged effect of monetary policy shocks on real economic 
activity, though the 60-month horizon in the IRF’s of this paper provide no evidence 
that the effect on IP was significantly lagged and any lagged effect longer than 60 
months is highly unlikely. While it may appear there is little research to prove that 
QE has a significant impact on real economic activity, the counterfactual analysis 
mentioned earlier must be considered. The results of most papers suggest QE had a 
minimal effect, but when considering the economy was likely still deteriorating, QE 
may have been more successful than it appears.    
Section 7: Conclusion 
In line with most previous research on the effectiveness of QE, the results of 
this research paper cast doubt on the efficacy of such programs on the surface. 
While it appears that the Federal Reserve was successful in lowering rates on 10-
Year Treasuries and 30-Year Mortgages and increasing price levels, these did not 
result in the increased real economic activity suggested by economic theory. This 
could indicate that economists need to reconsider the mechanisms through which 
QE affects the economy, or simply more research is needed to refine our models 
instead of concluding our current theories are completely insufficient. On the other 
hand, it is entirely possible that the observed effects of QE on the economy are a 
result of the economy continuing to decline after QE began, thus implying that 
quantitative easing cushioned the blow of what could have been a catastrophic 
recession, as suggested by the counterfactual analysis discussed previously in this 
paper. Due to the success in lowering long-term rates, increasing inflation, and 
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robustness of counterfactual analysis, quantitative easing more than likely had a 
positive impact on real economic activity that was negated by a continued downturn 
in the economy; however, with so few instances of QE worldwide and a lack of 
consensus from the research on the topic, its effectiveness is still uncertain. It is 
further important to note that there was a significant lag in observing the peak 
effect of QE on most of the macroeconomic variables discussed, which was similarly 
found in previous research in this area. However, analysis did show that QE did 
have a long-lasting effect on most variables that totaled significant effects as a 
result of QE, especially rates on Treasuries, mortgages, and inflation. Further 
research into developing a tool that affects the economy quicker would likely 
increase the effectiveness of monetary policy. The next step of research on QE 
should focus on explaining why the effect of interest rates and inflation did not pass 
through to an observable increase in real economic activity, while other research in 
this area could focus on zero restrictions instead of sign restrictions in the VAR 
model, different orderings of the VAR model to further test the robustness of the 
results, as well as meta-analysis of all the different research on QE programs 
worldwide.  
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Appendix  
Text in Parentheses denotes abbreviation used on FRED’s database.  
https://fred.stlouisfed.org 
 
1. Consumer Price Index (CPIAUCSL)- Consumer Price Index for All Urban 
Consumers: All Goods. Index: 1982-1984=100; seasonally adjusted.  
2. Industrial Production (INDPRO)- Industrial Production Index. Index: 2012; 
seasonally adjusted.  
3. Unemployment Rate (UNRATE)- Civilian Unemployment Rate. Seasonally 
adjusted.  
4. Federal Funds Rate (FEDFUNDS): Effective Federal Funds Rate; Seasonally 
adjusted.  
5. 30-Year Mortgage Rate (MORTGAGE30US): 30-Year Fixed-Rate Mortgage 
Average in the United States. Weekly observations averaged to obtain a 
monthly observation.  
6. 10-Year Treasury (DGS10)- 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate. Daily 
observations averaged to obtain a monthly observation.  
7. 1-Year Treasury (DGS1)- 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate. Daily 
observations averaged to obtain a monthly observation.  
8. Exchange Rate (TWEXBMTH)- Trade-weighted U.S. Dollar Index: Broad 
Goods. Index: January 1997=100.  
 
Figure 11 
Impulse Response Functions for VAR ordering {IP, UR, INFL, ER, M30, T10, T1, 
FFR, RES} 
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Figure 12 
Impulse Response Functions for VAR ordering {RES, T1, T10, M30, FFR, INFL, ER, 
IP, UR}  
 
 
 
Figure 13 
Impulse Response Functions for VAR ordering {RES, FFR, INFL, M30, T10, T1, IP, 
ER, UR} 
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Figure 14 
Impulse Response Functions for VAR ordering {RES, FFR, T1, T10, M30, INFL, ER, 
UR, IP} 
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